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Abstract 
 
Purpose – In this study, we examined the influence of one or more information security breaches 
on an organization’s stock market value as a way to benchmark the wider economic impact of 
such events. 
Design/Methodology/approach – We used an event studies based approach where a measure of 
the event’s economic impact can be constructed using security prices observed over a relatively 
short period of time. 
Findings – Based on the results, we argue that although no strong conclusions could be made 
given the current data constraints, there was enough evidence to show that such correlation 
exists, especially for recurring security breaches. 
Research limitations/implications – One of the main limitations of this study was the quantity 
and quality of published data on security breaches, as organizations tend not to share this 
information. 
Practical implications – One of the challenges in information security management is assessing 
the wider economic impact of security breaches. Subsequently, this helps drive investment 
decisions on security programmes that are usually seen as cost rather than moneymaking 
initiatives. 
Originality/value – We envisage that as more breach event data become more widely available 
due to compliance and regulatory changes, this approach has the potential to emerge as an 
important tool for information security managers to help support investment decisions. 
Keywords Information Security, Event Based Analysis, Information Security Breaches  
Paper type Research paper 
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1 Introduction and related work 
Protection of digital information has been and continues to be a growing concern across all areas 
of business. Cybersecurity-related attacks are not only increasing in number and diversity, but 
also becoming more damaging and disruptive (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2012). Despite increasing efforts to implement security controls in an attempt to prevent 
information security breaches, we continue to see news of organisations suffering from incidents 
(Passeri, 2013). This study investigates the impact of security events on the stock price of 
publicly listed companies. As described by Cutler et al. (1989) asset prices are generally 
attributable to changes in the fundamental value of the asset and as such react to announcements 
about corporate control, regulatory policy and macroeconomic conditions that plausibly affect 
fundamentals. Under the assumption of an efficient market (Fama, 1970), and the rejection of the 
random walk hypothesis (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988), we assume that new information relevant to 
a traded equity becoming public knowledge has the potential to affect the market value of that 
equity (deBondt and Thaler, 1985, Fama et al., 1969). This assumption has been the focus of 
various studies as discussed below. 
In this work, we particularly examine the impact of publicly reported information security 
incidents on the share price of organisations. Organisations store an ever increasing amount of 
information about their business partners, employees or customers and hold the responsibility to 
protect this data. At all stages of the data lifecycle – data collection, data use, data storage, data 
retention, data destruction – it must be ensured that sufficient protection is provided against 
unauthorized use (Grama, 2010). Yet we continue to see instances where this duty of care 
appears to fail as data is disclosed to unauthorized parties. While data breach is a widely 
discussed topic, there is little guidance in literature on the definition of a data breach. We are 
following the International Standards Organisation (2014) which defines a data breach to be a 
compromise of security that leads to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, 
unauthorized disclosure of, or access to protected data transmitted, stored or otherwise 
processed. In their cost of data breach study the Ponemon Institute (2014) finds a significantly 
higher monetary impact for those breaches caused by malicious or criminal attacks. 
Consequently, in our research we focus on information security breaches caused by external 
malicious or criminal attacks. 
 
As it is notoriously difficult to obtain any information on direct or indirect cost resulting from an 
information security breach, a study of the market reaction to such an incident is the best proxy 
for economic consequences. A common approach for this is the use of event studies where a 
measure of the event’s economic impact can be constructed using security prices observed over a 
relatively short period of time (MacKinlay, 1997). At the core of an event study is the 
measurement of an abnormal stock return during the observation window. The observation 
window typically includes a time period leading up to the observed event, the event itself, as well 
as a post event period. The application of event studies in this form is well documented in 
academic research covering corporate events like earning announcements, stock splits (Fama et 
al., 1969) and mergers and acquisitions (Duso et al., 2010). 
Previous studies leveraging event study methodology to investigate the effect of information 
security incident events on market value include work by Kannan et al. (2007), Yayla and Hu 
(2011), Cavusoglu et al. (2004), Campbell et al. (2003), Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) and 
Garg et al. (2003). Wang et al. (2007) take a different approach and apply event study 
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methodology to financial reporting data rather than public breach announcements. Telang and 
Wattal (2007) apply the methodology to a precursory event, announcement of software 
vulnerabilities, to observe the effect on stakeholders in this context. Andoh-Baidoo et al. (2010) 
extend event study results with decision tree induction to further examine the relationship 
between independent variables. 
The following section highlights the research methodology used. Section 3 presents the research 
questions and hypothesis as well as the dataset used for validation. In section 4, the experiment 
conducted is described. Results are then discussed in section 5. The study limitations and 
potential threats to validity are covered in section 6. And finally, conclusions are drawn in 
section 7. 
 
2 Research methodology 
Measuring or even estimating the true impact of information security breach events on the 
economic wellbeing of organisations is a difficult problem to solve. Industry reports like the 
Ponemon study (Ponemon Institute, 2014) aim to approximate the cost taking various factors like 
expense outlays for detection, escalation, notification, after-the-fact (ex-post) response, analysis 
of the economic impact of lost or diminished customer trust and confidence as measured by 
customer turnover or churn, into consideration but also acknowledge limitations of their 
approach. A possible alternative developed in the field of economics is the event study 
methodology. Event study is a statistical approach relying on the assumption of efficient markets 
to identify abnormal returns resulting from an event. MacKinlay (1997) explains that the 
usefulness of such a study stems from the fact that, given rationality in the marketplace, the 
effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices. Although this relies on the 
assumption of an efficient or rational market, which is not without problems itself (Malkiel, 
2003), the results produced are perceived to be a fair (non biased) ‘cause – effect’ 
approximation. 
At the core of an event study is an asset measureable over time (e.g. valuation of equity) and an 
event that is suspected to affect the value of that asset. Practical issues like data availability for a 
chosen asset should be considered early on. Obtaining the necessary dataset to complete the 
study may be difficult (where data is not publicly accessible) or not feasible due to cost or 
resource constraints. To conduct a study, the time of the event must be defined and a time 
window constructed around it. This window includes a period leading up to the event (estimation 
window) to baseline expected or normal returns, a narrow event window, and a post event 
window to measure the impact. The selection of the event window needs to strike a balance 
between being too narrow, potentially missing leading or trailing reaction, and too broad, risking 
deluding results through confounding events and other long term event study issues (Kothari and 
Warner, 2004). With the basic requirements in place, the normal returns for the asset can be 
calculated throughout the estimation window followed by a calculation of the potential abnormal 
returns in the event window. Two common approaches for this are the constant mean return 
model and the market model. A detailed description of the model intricacies and varieties is out 
of scope for this paper. Further details on this can be found in Brown and Warner (1985) and 
Kothari and Warner (2004). 
 
3 Hypothesis development and approach 
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As mentioned in section 1, event study methodology has previously been applied to study the 
economic impact of information security events. The amount of available research remains 
limited compared to other areas, particularly considering the increasing interest in and 
prevalence of publicly reported information security breaches. This study aims to extend the 
existing research by investigating stock price reaction of organisations that have been affected by 
information security events more than once. The study seeks to answer two main research 
questions: 
 
• RQ1: Do publicly reported information security breaches impact stock prices of affected 
organisations? 
• RQ2: Is there a difference in stock price impact, compared to a previous breach of that 
organisation, if organisations experience a subsequent information security breach event? 
 
These questions are formulated in two hypotheses: 
 
H1 – Publicly reported information security breaches do not lead to abnormal returns for the 
stock price of the affected organisation. 
H2 – There is no difference in stock price reaction between the first measured breach event and a 
subsequent breach event for an organisation 
 
With the help of RQ2 we attempt to get an understanding of the reaction of market participants if 
the same organisation is breached repeatedly. We try to clarify whether investors penalise 
organisations in such cases (i.e. failure to provide tangible improvements on information 
security), show indifferent behaviour or even react positively.  
To answer the outlined research questions, the study needs to be set up meeting several 
conditions. Figure 1 provides a high level view of the approach and the workflow followed. 
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Figure 1 - Approach and workflow 
As shown above, the normal returns for each asset (stock) in each group are estimated based on 
the corresponding estimation window (-121 to -3 days). Then, abnormal returns are calculated 
based on the event window for each asset (-2 to +2 days). This results in a cumulative abnormal 
residual for each asset from which a cumulative average abnormal residual is calculated. 
Statistical significance tests are then applied to evaluate results against the stated hypothesis in 
the workflow (Group 1, Group 2 and All assets). Cross group calculations are conducted based 
on the individual cumulative abnormal returns for Group 1 and Group 2 which is discussed in 
section 6. 
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3.1 Event data sample selection 
For this study, the requirements on the underlying event data set are rather high as a simple 
selection of organisations that suffered from a security breach is insufficient to provide an 
answer on H2. Data sets available from the Open Security Foundation’s DatalossDBi and the 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouseii have been considered. While the data available from DatalossDB 
is likely the most exhaustive repository available, its use for academic research is ambiguous due 
to copyright issues (Widup, 2012). On the other hand, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) 
data poses no such issue but is not as exhaustive and almost exclusively focused on US based 
entities. However, this limitation was not an issue for our work, and accordingly, the PRC 
dataset was chosen for our experiment. 
The PRC database provides information on data breaches reported starting 2005 and up to date. 
These are categorized under various verticals such as: Business, Educational, Government and 
Military, Healthcare and Non-profit Organisations. Breach information is categorized under: 
Unintended disclosure, Hacking or malware, Payment Card Fraud, Insider, Physical loss, 
Portable device, Stationary devices and Unknown or other. For this study, the full dataset for the 
Business category (i.e. excluding EDU, GOV, MED and NGO) was retrieved. The dataset was 
reviewed for repeat breaches and filtered for events classified as ‘HACK’, ‘DISC’ or ‘UNKN’. 
Other categories like ‘CARD’, ‘STAT’ or ‘PHYS’ were not considered due to the focus of this 
study being on information security breach events. The remaining 180 events were screened 
considering the following criteria: 
 
• Public company listed at a stock exchange 
• Price data availableiii 
• Not acquired, merged or ceased trading 
• No overlapping event windows for repeated breaches or duplicate events 
• No notable confounding events close to event windowiv 
 
Selection steps Records 
Total events retrieved from PRC 1490 
Events for organisations affected twice or more 409 
Events categorised as DISC, HACK, UNKN 180 
Events passing suitability criteria 50 
Table 1 - Privacy Rights Clearinghouse data set 
After applying the selection criteria, 25 organisations were filtered, each with two breach events. 
The breach events do not necessarily represent the first breach event for an organisation that ever 
occurred and not necessarily the second or latest. This is due to the limitation of the data 
available in the PRC database. The data sample for this study thus consists of a breach event that 
happened at an earlier stage and another that happened at a later stage in the trading history of an 
organisation. 
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3.2 Price data selection 
To calculate potential abnormal returns the stock price time series for each organisation in the 
event pool was required. Various sources for such information are available ranging from free 
services like Google Finance, Yahoo Finance to commercial providers like Bloomberg, Center 
for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and Thomson Reuters. Many previous studies prefer 
data provided by the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) whereas this study is using 
Thomson Reuters Datastream which is of at least comparable quality (Ince and Porter, 2006). 
To retrieve relevant time series data, the correct identifier for the equities in scope, as well as an 
appropriate time window was needed. The time window for price data was defined as 121 days 
before the event date and 30 days after. This time frame was chosen based on previous similar 
studies examining short horizon event effects utilising an estimation window (Dyckman et al., 
1984, Patell, 1976).  
This approach maximizes the estimation time window while avoiding overlap with an 
information security breach event affecting the same asset earlier in time. Due to the setup of this 
study, an extension of the pre event time window was not possible without introducing 
overlapping estimation windows between events.  
To conduct analysis of the events following the ‘Market Model’ time series, data for Standards & 
Poors 500 Composite (S&PCOMP) was retrieved. The S&P 500 was selected as it is listed as the 
local market index (INDXL) for the majority of the assets in scope. 
 
3.3 Data preparation and analysis method 
Before conducting the analysis, sanity checks and some formatting had to be conducted over the 
collected data. Two data issues were investigated. The first is when events fell on non-trading 
days. The second is gaps (missing information) in the pricing data. Once checks were completed 
(using manual and too support), the raw data was formatted as Comma Separated Values (CSV) 
following a predefined layout. 
To analyse the data, a standard Market Model methodology was chosen as per Dyckman et al. 
(1984). In that work, it was shown that the Market Model offers more powerful tests than the 
Mean-Adjusted Returns Model and the Market-Adjusted Returns Model in detecting abnormal 
performance. The Market Model is defined as shown in equation (1). 
 R i,τ = αi + βi!RM,τ + εi,τ!with!E εi,τ = 0!and!VAR εi,τ = σ!i! ! (1) 
 
Where R i,τ and RM,τ!are defined as period returns for the asset and market respectively. Alpha (αi), 
beta (βi), variance (σ!i! ) and prediction error (εi,τ) follow MacKinlay (1997).  
For this study, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) was chosen as estimation procedure over Scholes 
and Williams (1977). This is based on results from Dyckman et al. (1984) that showed the 
Scholes-Williams method of estimating risk does not enhance the ability to detect abnormal 
performance using daily data. Brown and Warner (1985) further comment on a possible bias 
issue induced by OLS, that is, when bias in beta exists events do not necessarily imply 
misspecification. All calculations were done using simple return mode (versus continuously 
compounded - log return mode). 
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The time windows of relevance were set as -121 to -3 days (estimation window) as explained in 
section 3.2 and -2 to 2 days (event window). We recognize that Dyckman et al. (1984) establish 
that extension of the event window has a disproportionally negative effect on the models ability 
to identify impact. However, an event window of 5 days (-2,-1,0,1,2) was chosen to account for 
any uncertainty around the event date. The uncertainty could emerge from many factors 
including the fact that security breach event dates are difficult to precisely pinpoint due to factors 
such as news dispersion and the speed of adjustment to the information revealed. This type of 
information typically follows a dispersion process starting with limited coverage (e.g. 
information security specific press) followed by wider coverage in technology outlets before it 
breaks to major news media outlets. 
 
4 Experiment 
As outlined in section 3.1, the dataset covers 25 organisations with two associated security 
breach events each. The overall set of 50 events was separated in two groups where Group 1 
contained the earlier event of each pair and Group 2 the later event. 
 
Symbol' Organisation' Event'date' Group'
@AAPL% Apple% 9/4/2012% 1%
@CMCSA% Comcast% 3/16/2009% 1%
@DRIV% Digital%River%Inc.% 6/4/2010% 1%
@FOXA% Fox%Entertainment%Group% 7/23/2007% 1%
@GOOG% Google% 4/27/2007% 1%
@HKFI% Hancock%Fabrics% 11/23/2009% 1%
@SRCE% 1st%Source%Bank% 6/10/2008% 1%
EXPN% Experian% 3/29/2007% 1%
H:ING% ING% 2/12/2010% 1%
REL% LexisNexis% 7/13/2009% 1%
U:C% Citigroup% 9/21/2007% 1%
U:CFR% Frost%Bank% 5/19/2006% 1%
U:CVS% CVS% 6/21/2005% 1%
U:EFX% Equifax% 2/11/2010% 1%
U:HIG% Hartford% 9/12/2007% 1%
U:JPM% JP%Morgan% 1/30/2011% 1%
U:LNC% Lincoln%Financial%Group% 7/26/2011% 1%
U:MWW% Monster.com% 8/23/2007% 1%
U:NYT% The%New%York%Times% 1/30/2013% 1%
U:ldos% Leidos% 7/20/2007% 1%
U:T% AT&T% 8/29/2006% 1%
U:TMUS% T`Mobile% 6/7/2009% 1%
U:VZ% Verizon% 8/12/2005% 1%
U:WFC% Wells%Fargo% 8/12/2008% 1%
U:WYN% Wyndham%Hotels%&%Resorts% 2/16/2009% 1%
 
Symbol' Organisation' Event'date' Group'
@AAPL% Apple% 2/19/2013% 2%
@CMCSA% NBC%Universal% 2/22/2013% 2%
@DRIV% Digital%River%Inc.% 12/22/2010% 2%
@FOXA% Fox%Entertainment%Group% 5/10/2011% 2%
@GOOG% Google% 3/7/2009% 2%
@HKFI% Hancock%Fabrics% 3/5/2010% 2%
@SRCE% 1st%Source%Bank% 11/19/2010% 2%
EXPN% Experian% 4/5/2012% 2%
H:ING% ING% 10/12/2010% 2%
REL% LexisNexis% 6/8/2011% 2%
U:C% Citigroup% 6/9/2011% 2%
U:CFR% Frost%Bank% 11/7/2007% 2%
U:CVS% CVS% 3/24/2012% 2%
U:EFX% Equifax% 10/10/2012% 2%
U:HIG% Hartford% 4/6/2011% 2%
U:JPM% JP%Morgan% 3/28/2013% 2%
U:LNC% Lincoln%Financial%Group% 9/16/2012% 2%
U:MWW% Monster.com% 1/23/2009% 2%
U:NYT% The%New%York%Times% 8/27/2013% 2%
U:ldos% Leidos% 1/18/2008% 2%
U:T% AT&T% 6/9/2010% 2%
U:TMUS% T`Mobile% 1/16/2012% 2%
U:VZ% Verizon% 8/25/2006% 2%
U:WFC% Wells%Fargo% 10/20/2011% 2%
U:WYN% Wyndham%Hotels%&%Resorts% 2/28/2010% 2%
 
Table 2 - Group overview 
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First, calculations were conducted over events in Group 1 to obtain the results on the earlier 
breach data. As shown in Figure 2, the cumulative average abnormal residuals (CAAR) exhibit a 
decrease of 2.38% over the defined event window with a positive to negative ratio of 7:18. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Group 1 event impact 
 
Based on the standardized cross-sectional test following the BMP approach (Boehmer et al., 
1991), with adjustments as proposed by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), it was shown that the 
statistical significance is 1%. To verify the results of the parametric test, an additional non-
parametric test was conducted. Following the observation by Cowan (1992) that the generalized 
sign test (GSIGN) becomes relatively more powerful as the length of the event window 
increases, the generalized sign test was selected over the rank approach as proposed by Corrado 
(1989). For Group 1, the GSIGN test does not confirm the parametric test results and merely 
approaches 5% significance level as seen in Table 3. 
 
Event'window' CAAR' Pos':'Neg' BMP' BMP'p' GSIGN' GSIGN'p'
(`2...2)% `0.0238% 7:18% `2.9066% 0.0037% `1.8993% 0.0575%
Table 3 - Test results Group 1 
 
To better understand the reason for this discrepancy, a manual review of the individual asset 
CAR was conducted. This was feasible as the sample size for this study is comparatively small. 
By plotting the results for Group 1 (Figure 3), it was found that the non-significant result in the 
GSIGN test is likely due to a strong outlier (U:WYN, -22%). 
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Figure 3 - Individual CAR Group 1 
As normality of the data is not warrant, the strong significance level in the parametric test should 
be considered of limited relevance. Although non-parametric tests are not immune to outliers 
(Zimmerman, 1994) taking into consideration that the non-parametric tests approaches 
significance level, rejection of H1 seems likely. 
 
Calculations were repeated for the events in Group 2 using the same approach as above. The 
results of Group 2 are noticeably different to the observations of Group 1 showing a CAAR of 
only -0.16% with a flat AAR distribution around the event date as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Group 2 event impact 
Looking at the statistical tests, there was no indication of significance in the results for Group 2, 
either for the parametric or non-parametric methods. 
 
Event'
window' CAAR' Pos':'Neg' BMP' BMP'p' GSIGN' GSIGN'p'
(`2...2)% `0.0016% 9:16% 0.0213% 0.983% `1.1244% 0.2608%
Table 4 -Test results Group 2 
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As an additional verification, the individual CAR for each asset in the group was plotted. Figure 
5 shows no outliers and exhibits a balanced dataset for Group 2.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Individual CAR Group 2 
 
The results for Group 2 show no statistical significance on any indicator, accordingly, rejection 
of H1 for this group cannot be concluded.  
In addition to the calculations for each event group, the combined event data was analysed to 
obtain the results for the overall event pool. Taking all events into consideration, the CAAR 
showed a return of -1.27% carried by a 16:34 positive:negative ratio.  
 
 
Figure 6 - Event impact for the complete event pool 
 
The parametric test showed little significance and suffered from non-normality in the dataset (as 
Group 1 data is a subset and thus carries the same outlier issue). The GSIGN test results are well 
within the critical region, however. 
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Event'window' CAAR' Pos':'Neg' BMP' BMP'p' GSIGN' GSIGN'p'
(`2...2)% `0.0127% 16:34% `1.3943% 0.1632% `2.138% 0.0325%
Table 5 - Test results complete event pool 
 
The CAR for each individual asset in each group was plotted as seen in Figure 7 showing the 
reaction for each organization in the sample pool to both events in an overlay illustration. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Combined CAR for the event pool 
 
Considering the outlier problem, and subsequently the implications from parametric testing, the 
results of the non-parametric tests are given priority for reaching a conclusion on H1. Taking all 
50 events into consideration, we identified a negative effect (-1.27%) over the observed event 
window which is considered significant with a p value < 0.05 (Pearson, 1900) as shown by the 
non-parametric test.  
To answer the question posed by H2, the individual CAR for each asset in Group 1 are compared 
with those of Group 2. The intention is to understand if cumulative abnormal returns for each 
asset are significantly different between the first measured breach event (Group 1) and the 
subsequent breach event (Group 2). A visual comparison of the individual CAR provided no 
clear indication albeit Group 1 appeared to show a slightly stronger negative reaction. 
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Figure 8 - Box plot of individual CAR between groups 
 
Comparing the CAAR for each group as calculated in the previous section, Group 1 showed a 
considerable stronger negative return (Group 1 -2.38%, Group 2 -0.16%); However, as noted 
earlier, this was driven by an outlier. 
To better understand the impact of the identified outlier, we temporarily removed the outlier in 
Group 1 from the dataset. This resulted in a negative return of 1.55%. It also showed a tendency 
to normality, yet, indicated that there was still a noticeably stronger negative reaction for Group 
1. 
As discussed earlier, data in Group 1 is not normally distributed which reduces the usefulness of 
parametric testing. To understand the extent to which the data is non-normal, a Shapiro-Wilk 
(Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) test was applied to both groups. Results are shown in Table 6. 
 
SW#test## Group#1# Group#2#
W% 0.671252696% 0.963874%
p`value% 3.06201E`06% 0.496879%
alpha% 0.05% 0.05%
normal% no% yes%
Table 6 - Shapiro-Wilk test  
 
While a paired samples t-test was conducted, it was not taken into consideration. Instead, the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for Paired Samples (Wilcoxon, 1945) was used to 
assess significance of differences in the dataset. With a p value of 0.074 on the two-tailed test, 
we could not reject H2.  
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5 Results 
Observing the CAAR for study Group 1, we found a negative return of 2.38% aligned with the 
event date corresponding to a p value of 0.0037 using the standardized cross-sectional test as 
proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991). This result in the parametric test is likely driven by an outlier 
as described in section 4, however. The non-parametric result under generalized sign testing, on 
the other hand, finds significance approaching the 95% confidence level (p value = 0.0575). 
Considering the tendency of both test results we reject H1 for this group. For Group 2, we found 
a CAAR that is very close to zero (-0.16%) with consequently insignificant statistical results. 
Applying the model to the whole event pool, we found a negative CAAR of 1.27% that showed 
significance on the non-parametric test (p value = 0.0325) but not on the parametric test (p value 
= 0.1632). The study shows a strong tendency towards rejection of H1. 
H2 is addressed by comparing the cumulative abnormal residuals between group one and two. 
Utilizing a Shapiro-Wilk test, we found data in Group 1 to be non-normal suggesting the use of a 
non-parametric test, such as Wilcoxon Signed-Rank, to conduct a statistical evaluation. Although 
the difference in absolute CAAR between Group 1 and Group 2 seemed to indicate that there is 
ground to reject H2, the statistical test did not support this initial notion. The Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test showed only marginal significance (p value = 0.074) on the two-tailed test, which is 
considered insufficient to reject H2 in context of this study. Or in other words, we found merely 
weak statistical evidence in this study that the market reacts differently to a subsequent breach 
event affecting the same organisation.   
 
6 Threats to validity and study limitations  
Based on the results of this study, we weakly conclude that there is an impact on the stock price 
of organisations that suffer from a publicly announced information security breach. The 
weakness in explanatory power is driven by several limitations inherent to event studies in 
general and this study in particular. Event study methodology relies on the assumption of an 
efficient market with rational players. In reality, this assumption does not necessarily hold 
considering efficiency (Malkiel, 2003) or rationality (deBondt and Thaler, 1985, Dichev and 
Janes, 2003). Kothari and Warner (2004) caution that predictions about securities’ unconditional 
expected returns are imprecise, consequently the greater the imprecision in the predicted returns 
(error factor) the lesser the explanatory power any model has which is based on it. Particularly 
for short-term event studies, knowing the precise event date is of crucial importance. Uncertainty 
about the exact event date is an issue and a compromise between availability of data and quality 
of the dataset had to be made. Yet, even if the precise date of the event is known, there is still 
uncertainty around the speed of information dissemination across market participants as 
previously discussed. Further limitations stem from potential unrelated event correlation 
(confounding events) around the event dates, which are difficult to reliably identify ex post. In 
addition, there are noteworthy challenges specific to RQ2 affecting the time window between the 
first measured breach event and the second measured breach event. Following such an event 
organisations not only work on mitigation of the original breach cause but also invest in 
improvements and trust building initiatives such as replacing key executive positions (Chief 
Executive Officer, Chief Technology Officer, Chief Security Officer, etc.). The potential 
influence of such activities on the subsequent breach event has not been considered in this study.   
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These potential issues, as well as the outlier in the sample pool, are magnified by the small 
sample size available for this study reducing the significance of statistical tests.  
In terms of this study, the results can be seen as indication of impact tendency. While there were 
merely weakly explanatory results applying strict methodology, a tendency to significance could 
be identified, particularly if we only consider one tailed testing results. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Understanding the role of information security in context of the economic well-being of an 
organisation is a difficult yet important proposition (Anderson, 2001, Gordon and Loeb, 2002). 
Research in this area has been looking at existing approaches used by economists and applied 
promising methods in an attempt to answer questions on the economic value of information 
security. One such approach is the event study methodology as applied in this work. As 
discussed in section 1, we rely on the assumption of an efficient market to measure potential 
abnormal effects caused by an information security relevant event. In this study, we set to answer 
two main research questions: 
• RQ1: Do publicly reported information security breaches impact stock prices of affected 
organisations? 
• RQ2: Is there a difference in stock price impact, compared to a previous breach, if 
organisations experience a subsequent information security breach event? 
To answer these questions, we retrieved event data from the PRC database, filtered it for 
relevancy, and matched the resulting 50 events with corresponding stock price and index time 
series information to conduct a market model event study.  
The data were split into two groups. For the first group, consisting of each organisations earlier 
breach event, we found an indication of significant negative reaction (parametric p value = 
0.0037, non-parametric p value = 0.0575). For the second group containing the latter events, 
there was no significant reaction (parametric p value = 0.98, non-parametric p value = 0.26). The 
combined event pool shows a tendency to significance based on the parametric test (p value = 
0.1632) and non-parametric test (p value = 0.0325) findings.  
Considering the limitations discussed, for RQ1, we weakly conclude that information security 
events have an impact on the economic well being of organisations, as expressed by the 
corresponding stock price based on the parameters of this study. For RQ2, we did observe a 
difference in reaction between the two study groups with a non-parametric test p value 
approaching significance (0.074).  
Finally, we can conclude that the selected approach and methodology to evaluate economic 
impact of information security events is promising. If some of the limitations discussed can be 
addressed, such as the sample size and the precise identification of event dates, the methodology 
can provide valuable input to support economic decision making within enterprise risk 
management programs. This indeed might become possible in the near future where it is 
expected that public information on data breaches will become more widely available and more 
detailed as laws and regulations become more explicit on the reporting of such incidents 
(Dipietro, 2013, Smedinghoff, 2006). This will make more quality data available upon which the 
methodology can be applied. The larger sample size will allow more sophisticated analysis to be 
conducted and help draw more reliable conclusions. 
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1 Appendix A 
List of organisation in the event study with business categories as provided by Thomson Reuters Business Classification. 
Organisation TRBC L1 TRBC L2 TRBC L3 TRBC L4 TRBC L5 
APPLE INCO. Technology Technology Equipment 
Computers, Phones & Household 
Electronics Computer Hardware Computer Hardware - NEC 
COMCAST CORP. 
Telecommunications 
Services 
Telecommunications 
Services Telecommunications Services 
Integrated Telecommunications 
Services 
Integrated Telecommunications 
Services - NEC 
DIGITAL RIVER INCO. Technology Technology Equipment 
Computers, Phones & Household 
Electronics Computer Hardware Computer Hardware - NEC 
TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY FOX Consumer Cyclicals 
Cyclical Consumer 
Services Media & Publishing Entertainment Production Entertainment Production - NEC 
GOOGLE INCO. Technology Software & IT Services Software & IT Services Internet Services Search Engines 
HANCOCK FABRICS 
INCO. Consumer Cyclicals 
Cyclical Consumer 
Products Textiles & Apparel Textiles & Leather Goods Textiles & Leather Goods - NEC 
1ST SOURCE CORP. Financials 
Banking & Investment 
Services Banking Services Banks Commercial Banks 
EXPERIAN PLC. Industrials 
Industrial & Commercial 
Services 
Professional & Commercial 
Services 
Professional Information 
Services Financial Information Providers 
ING GROEP NV Financials Insurance Insurance Life & Health Insurance Life & Health Insurance - NEC 
REED ELSEVIER PLC. Industrials 
Industrial & Commercial 
Services 
Professional & Commercial 
Services 
Professional Information 
Services Journals & Scholarly Research 
CITIGROUP INCO. Financials 
Banking & Investment 
Services Banking Services Banks Banks - NEC 
CULLEN FO.BANKERS 
INCO. Financials 
Banking & Investment 
Services Banking Services Banks Banks - NEC 
CVS CAREMARK CORP. 
Consumer Non-
Cyclicals Food & Drug Retailing Food & Drug Retailing Drug Retailers Drug Retailers - NEC 
EQUIFAX INCO. Industrials 
Industrial & Commercial 
Services 
Professional & Commercial 
Services 
Professional Information 
Services 
Professional Information Services - 
NEC 
THE HARTFORD 
FNSR.GPIN. Financials Insurance Insurance Multiline Insurance & Brokers 
Multiline Insurance & Brokers - 
NEC 
JP MORGAN CHASE & 
CO. Financials 
Banking & Investment 
Services Banking Services Banks Banks - NEC 
LINCOLN NAT.CORP. Financials Insurance Insurance Life & Health Insurance Life & Health Insurance - NEC 
MONSTER WORLDWIDE 
INCO. Industrials 
Industrial & Commercial 
Services 
Professional & Commercial 
Services Employment Services Executive Search Services 
NEW YORK TIMES CO. Consumer Cyclicals 
Cyclical Consumer 
Services Media & Publishing Consumer Publishing Consumer Publishing - NEC 
LEIDOS HOLDINGS 
INCO. Technology Software & IT Services Software & IT Services IT Services & Consulting IT Services & Consulting - NEC 
AT&T INCO. 
Telecommunications 
Services 
Telecommunications 
Services Telecommunications Services 
Wireless Telecommunications 
Services 
Wireless Telecommunications 
Services - NEC 
T-MOBILE US INCO. 
Telecommunications 
Services 
Telecommunications 
Services Telecommunications Services 
Wireless Telecommunications 
Services Satellite Service Operators 
VERIZON Telecommunications Telecommunications Telecommunications Services Integrated Telecommunications Integrated Telecommunications 
20 
 
COMMUNICATIONS Services Services Services Services - NEC 
WELLS FARGO & CO. Financials 
Banking & Investment 
Services Banking Services Banks Banks - NEC 
WYNDHAM 
WORLDWIDE CORP. Consumer Cyclicals 
Cyclical Consumer 
Services Hotels & Entertainment Services Hotels, Motels & Cruise Lines 
Hotels, Motels & Cruise Lines - 
NEC 
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2 Appendix B 
This table shows each event window test result calculated for each group. The event window considered for this paper (-2, 2) has been marked in 
grey for each group. Critical region findings (p value <= 0.05) have been highlighted as well. 
 
!
Date% CAAR% Pos%:%Neg% t/Test%time/series% Prob.% t/Test%cross/sectional% Prob.% Patell%Z% Prob.% Boehmer%et%al.% Prob.% Corrado%Rank% Prob.% Sign%Test% Prob.%
Group%1%
! ! !
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
1% (#2...2)! #0.0238! 7:18! #2.0969! 0.036! #2.4845! 0.013! #1.7782! 0.0754! #2.9066! 0.0037! #2.219! 0.0265! #1.8993! 0.0575!
1% (#2...1)! #0.0152! 8:17! #1.4958! 0.1347! #2.4563! 0.014! #1.333! 0.1825! #2.1033! 0.0354! #1.3769! 0.1685! #1.4986! 0.134!
1% (#2...0)! #0.0203! 7:18! #2.3077! 0.021! #1.8898! 0.0588! #1.8947! 0.0581! #2.6367! 0.0084! #1.8885! 0.059! #1.8993! 0.0575!
1% (#1...1)! #0.0114! 11:14! #1.2948! 0.1954! #1.9092! 0.0562! #0.9271! 0.3539! #1.6479! 0.0994! #0.8774! 0.3803! #0.2963! 0.767!
1% (#1...0)! #0.0165! 10:15! #2.2967! 0.0216! #1.4211! 0.1553! #1.5708! 0.1162! #1.8989! 0.0576! #1.4402! 0.1498! #0.6971! 0.4857!
1% (0...0)! #0.0022! 10:15! #0.4412! 0.6591! #1.0857! 0.2776! #0.359! 0.7196! #0.7612! 0.4466! #0.4568! 0.6478! #0.6971! 0.4857!
1% (0...1)! 0.0029! 11:14! 0.3989! 0.6899! 0.3894! 0.697! 0.1815! 0.856! 0.2807! 0.7789! 0.0426! 0.966! #0.2963! 0.767!
Group%2%
! ! !
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
2% (#2...2)! #0.0016! 9:16! #0.1577! 0.8747! #0.2767! 0.782! 0.0227! 0.9819! 0.0213! 0.983! 0.0274! 0.9782! #1.1244! 0.2608!
2% (#2...1)! #0.005! 10:15! #0.5601! 0.5754! #0.9685! 0.3328! #0.5036! 0.6145! #0.4451! 0.6562! #0.3886! 0.6976! #0.7238! 0.4692!
2% (#2...0)! #0.0057! 11:14! #0.733! 0.4636! #1.2464! 0.2126! #0.8033! 0.4218! #0.6786! 0.4974! #0.7437! 0.457! #0.3232! 0.7466!
2% (#1...1)! #0.0008! 11:14! #0.1005! 0.9199! #0.1686! 0.8661! #0.3988! 0.69! #0.3781! 0.7054! #0.0108! 0.9914! #0.3232! 0.7466!
2% (#1...0)! #0.0014! 14:11! #0.2288! 0.8191! #0.3337! 0.7386! #0.7601! 0.4472! #0.6704! 0.5026! #0.3745! 0.708! 0.8787! 0.3796!
2% (0...0)! 0.0006! 13:12! 0.1361! 0.8917! 0.1497! 0.881! #0.2323! 0.8163! #0.2261! 0.8211! 0.0506! 0.9597! 0.478! 0.6326!
2% (0...1)! 0.0013! 14:11! 0.2019! 0.84! 0.3165! 0.7516! 0.1074! 0.9145! 0.1253! 0.9003! 0.3971! 0.6913! 0.8787! 0.3796!
Group%all%
! ! !
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
All% (#2...2)! #0.0127! 16:34! #1.6773! 0.0935! #2.2105! 0.0271! #1.2414! 0.2145! #1.3943! 0.1632! #1.4204! 0.1555! #2.138! 0.0325!
All% (#2...1)! #0.0101! 18:32! #1.4925! 0.1356! #2.4902! 0.0128! #1.2987! 0.194! #1.4068! 0.1595! #1.1954! 0.2319! #1.5714! 0.1161!
All% (#2...0)! #0.013! 18:32! #2.2159! 0.0267! #2.2138! 0.0268! #1.9078! 0.0564! #1.9215! 0.0547! #1.8028! 0.0714! #1.5714! 0.1161!
All% (#1...1)! #0.0061! 22:28! #1.0378! 0.2994! #1.5965! 0.1104! #0.9376! 0.3485! #1.1073! 0.2682! #0.5783! 0.563! #0.4381! 0.6613!
All% (#1...0)! #0.009! 24:26:00! #1.8742! 0.0609! #1.441! 0.1496! #1.6482! 0.0993! #1.6228! 0.1046! #1.2257! 0.2203! 0.1286! 0.8977!
All% (0...0)! #0.0008! 23:27! #0.241! 0.8096! #0.3597! 0.7191! #0.4181! 0.6759! #0.5274! 0.5979! #0.2576! 0.7967! #0.1548! 0.877!
All% (0...1)! 0.0021! 25:25:00! 0.4328! 0.6652! 0.4985! 0.6181! 0.2043! 0.8381! 0.2632! 0.7924! 0.3352! 0.7375! 0.4119! 0.6804!
 
We computed all event-study results using the Event Study Metrics software. 
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i http://datalossdb.org/ 
ii http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach 
iii Data source – Thomson Reuters Datastream 
iv Data source – Recorded Future (https://www.recordedfuture.com/) 
